Shafer's theory of evidential reasoning has recently received much attention as a possible model for probabilistic reasoning in expert system applications. This paper discusses the particular difficulties of implementing Shafer's belief functions in the context of the most common form of expert system, rule-based systems. The two most important problems are: the representation of the expert's subjective degrees of belief corresponding to his expressed rules, and the computational complexity of the inference mechanism for combining evidence. We argue that a potential approach for dealing with both problems is given by introducing constraints on the structure of the belief functions. These constraints, along with the expressed rules and the elicited belief values, form the expert's total knowledge.
Introduction

Uncertainty in rule-based systems
Rule-based expert systems are collections of production rules which are linked or "chained" together to simulate a human expert's reasoning process. (A production rule is a statement "Copyright 1986 by International Business Machines Corporation. Copying in printed form for private use is permitted without payment of royalty provided that ( 1 ) each reproduction is done without alteration and ( 2 ) the Journal reference and IBM copyright notice are included on the first page. The title and abstract, but no other portions, of this paper may be copied or distributed royalty free without further permission by computer-based and other information-service systems. Permission to republish any other portion of this paper must be obtained from the Editor.
the system to have a joint probability distribution on the assignment of truth values to the evidence nodes. Additionally, we would expect the system to update the expert's probability distribution with the user's probability distribution and then calculate the marginal (joint) probability distribution on the assignment of truth values to the propositions which are not antecedents of any rule (the goal nodes).
We see a variety of difficulties with this scheme:
1. It is unreasonable to expect anyone, user or expert, to express a joint probability distribution on the assignment of truth values to a large collection of propositions. This is because of a. The potential size of such a collection. b. The difficulty that most people have expressing probabilities even on collections with only one proposition. 2. There is an inherent asymmetry in the nature and use of the opinions supplied by the expert and the user. The user's opinion is used to update the expert's.
prohibit implementation for systems with as few as fifty propositions.
The amount of calculation required is so large as to
In the second of the two general methods of incorporating uncertainty into a rule-based expert system, we suppose that a user's opinions are pooled with an expert's opinions. We expect the expert constructing the system to express uncertainty about the assignment of truth values to all the propositions in the system. Equally, we expect the user to express uncertainty about the assignment of truth values to all the propositions in the system. The expert and the user each express their uncertainty by a decomposition of their respective universal belief function; pieces of the decomposition are attached to the rules by the expert and are attached to the evidence nodes by the user. We use belief functions as a particular measure of uncertainty because of their intuitive appeal, but this general scheme allows the possibility of other measures.
scheme:
This scheme overcomes some of the difficulties of the first I . Neither expert nor user must express a "joint" opinion over the truth values of all the propositions in the system but must only express that portion of the opinion which is associated with a particular rule or evidence node. 2. The opinions of both expert and user are presumed to be subjective and are treated symmetrically. In particular, the roles of expert and user may be interchanged without affecting the result.
This paper is an attempt to use the belief functions described in [4] to overcome the difficulties of the first 94 I WILLIAM F. EDDY AND < scheme and to achieve the goals of the second scheme. Current applications of Shafer's belief functions to rulebased expert systems face at least two major obstacles. First, in typical applications the set of epistemic possibilities termed the frame of discernment has previously been restricted to a mutually exclusive collection of propositions.
This implies a fairly simple rule structure for the corresponding system. Second, there does not exist a standard methodology for attaching an expert's beliefs to the rules. Consequently, previous applications of belief functions to rule-based systems have been ad hoc.
This paper studies the consequences of the most common frames, that is, those with some mutually supporting propositions. We believe that it is more natural to base a frame of discernment on the expert-supplied rules associated with such mutually supporting propositions and that frames which are based on mutually exclusive propositions are artificially simple. We investigate how belief functions might be applied to mutually supporting propositions and give an example which demonstrates the construction of such a rulebased frame.
The frame of discernment is the critical element in the elicitation process. Rule-based expert systems imply "hidden" structures in the set of all possible subsets of propositions. Therefore, the expert only need express his degree of belief over the "visible" elements of the set of subsets. This can result in important computational savings (compared with the set of all possible subsets). This paper also demonstrates a decomposition of belief functions which allows a user, at the time of consultation with the system, to express his beliefs over the frame of discernment, which are then combined with the expert's expressed beliefs associated with the rules. 
Belief functions in production systems
TCS
The correspondence is easily seen by substituting one equation into the other in either order. Dempster's rule for combining two belief functions is most easily given in terms of the corresponding basic probability assignments. Let m, and m2 be two basic probability assignments on the same frame, 0. Dempster's rule defines their orthogonal sum 
ml(S)m2(T).
SnTM
The belief function mI2 contains the combined evidence of m, and m2.
the first scheme described in the section "Uncertainty in rule-based systems" as follows. First, we substitute Shafer's belief functions for probabilities. This has several immediate advantages:
Our proposed method addresses some of the difficulties of
The basic probability assignment corresponding to a probability distribution has m ( S ) = 0 for S 4 0.
1. An expert or user who finds it difficult to express opinions in probabilities can more easily express opinions with belief functions. 2. An expert or user who is unable (or unwilling) to use general belief functions can always use the special belief function which corresponds to "I don't know" (or "I won't tell"). 3. An expert or user who wishes to use probabilities to express an opinion has that option available, since probabilities are a special case of belief functions.
The basic probability assignment corresponding to the special belief function which expresses total ignorance has m ( S ) = 0 for S # 0 and m(@) = 1.
Second, we allow the expert to express his opinion through partial beliefs attached to each individual rule, rather than requiring a joint belief in the assignment of truth values to all the propositions. While this appears to be an assumption of independence, we argue in the section "Dependence and its implications for elicitation" that, in fact, there can still be strong dependence in the expert-supplied beliefs.
Third, to reduce the amount of computation involved, we eliminate from consideration certain possible assignments of truth values to the propositions; our choice of which assignments to eliminate is dictated by the expert-supplied rules.
We imagine that the expert has a joint belief function on the assignment of truth values to all the propositions in the system but only expresses an opinion as partial belief functions associated with individual rules. We also imagine that the user has a joint belief function on the assignment of truth values to all the propositions in the system but only expresses an opinion as partial belief functions associated with individual evidence nodes.
The system operates by chaining using Dempster's rule of combination as follows. As a rule is "fired," the current frame of discernment is refined to include the proposition(s) implied by the rule. The belief function is extended to the refined frame and combined with the expert-supplied belief attached to the rule (after it has also been extended to the same refined frame). Because of the commutativity of Dempster's rule, this process can be initiated with the user's belief associated with a single evidence node or with the expert's belief associated with an individual rule.
We emphasize that each person has a single universal belief function and that a partial belief attached to a rule or a node represents part of only one possible decomposition of the universal belief. The symmetry inherent in the combination rule suggests that the structure of both user and expert beliefs should be the same.
The computational burden is the most significant drawback to the use of belief functions in production systems. If we have a collection of m general propositions, then there are 2" mutually exclusive possible propositions within the system. Direct application of Shafer's theory requires that we consider the set of all subsets of this frame of discernment, a collection of 22m general propositions. Obviously, any reduction in the size of the exponent 2" is highly desirable. Barnett [ 5 ] has studied this problem; by breaking the frame into independent partitions (a very strong assumption), Barnett reduces the computational complexity from exponential to linear. Here, we are interested in retaining the more natural possibility of dependence among the propositions in the system. 95
where R, is of the form P, --* Pk. As an example, suppose we
where R , is PI --* P,. We interpret this to mean that whenever PI is true, then P2 must be true. of strings, we see that the rule R, has hidden 2' "' elements of 2'. We use the term hidden to indicate that conceptually the elements are present, but because every belief function assigns them a basic probability number of zero, they do not enter into any calculations. In practice, then, we take our list of propositions 2' and use our list of rules M to determine which elements of 2' remain visible.
8 AND/OR representation of a small production system.
To clarify the ideas we consider a production system based on the following six propositions:
Mutually supporting propositions and ruleimplied structure
Disjoint partitions
Shafer's basic theory, presented in [4], requires that the frame of discernment (i.e., the set of possibilities) be composed of mutually exclusive propositions. This means that only one proposition can be true. In nearly all real situations, the propositions of concern are not mutually 3 exclusive, and consequently direct application of Shafer's theory is impossible.
suppose that Let Q be a set of mutually supporting propositions; that is, a = { P I , P2, . . . , P,).
By mutually supporting we merely mean that any assignment of truth values to the propositions is possible.
Let 2* be a list of all the possible assignments of truth A = Sleet is falling outside. B = Harvey has mud on his shoes. C = The door is unlocked. D = Harvey's footprints are in the house. E = Harvey's coat is in the house. G = Harvey is in the house.
We suppose also that the expert-supplied rules are the following; the associated list of hidden elements is given with each rule. values to the elements of a. To simplify what follows, we use the symbol 1 to stand for true, the symbol 0 to stand for false, and the symbol * to stand for unspecified. By using this ~--*~--, Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of these rules in the form of an AND/OR tree. We refer to this example in notation any assignment can be written as a string of n 3CLLIUII J .
symbols; for example, in a system a with four propositions, the string (*I**) would indicate that P, is true and (SO**) would indicate that P, is false. As a more general example, ( 1 IO*) would indicate that P, is true and P, is true and P, is false. Our standard interpretation of a completely specified string such as ( 1 100) is the logical and of its components;
that is, P, is true and P2 is true and P, is false and P4 is false.
Our standard interpretation of a string such as ( 1 10%) is that it represents the string ( 1 100) or the string ( 1 10 1 ) . Naive approaches to selection of belief functions There are several possible forms of belief functions which an expert might attach to a rule, and there are several possible forms of a belief function which a user might attach to evidence. In this section, we consider some of the possible forms of each in the context of a trivial system. Let 0 = (A, B J , and let M = {R), where the rule R is A -* B. One approach to selecting a belief function to attach to R would argue that the only situation that is important occurs when A is true and the rule R is correct. This leads to a choice of the form m , l ( l l ) l = P I , 
and BelAl, is zero for all other propositions except (::). In this case, the proposition "B is true" has a belief which does depend on p a . However, because of the structure of m A l , the additional evidence can only reduce the initial belief in B.
We again conclude that one of the two choices m, or m,, has a structure which is too limited to generate the kind of behavior we seek. In the next section we suggest that, in fact, all of Bel,, Bel,, and BelAl are too limited.
user beliefs which will allow belief to shift from one set to another as additional evidence is pooled.
Our goal is to choose a structure for both rule beliefs and
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Attaching beliefi to rules
The forms of the belief functions considered in the previous section are limited in their ability to represent expert information about the rules and user information about the evidence. We prefer the following form for expert-supplied opinions: This is related to the conditional interpretation of the rule R. We assign belief p , to the proposition AandB and belief q, to the proposition notA.
We first note that because the element ( 10) is hidden, as discussed in Section 2, we assign zero belief to it. We interpret the value of p , as expressing the strength of the necessity of the rule R. Similarly, we interpret q, as expressing the strength of the sufficiency of the rule. We also note that m , is a special case of m, letting q, = 0. Additionally, m, can be thought of as a generalization of m,, taking the belief p, and splitting it into the two components P3 and q, .
Letting BelAl, = BelAl 63 Bel,, we get and BelAl3 is zero for all other propositions except (::). In this case, the proposition " B is true" has a belief which also does depend on p a , but the belief can only increase with the additional evidence introduced by pA . A more general structure for m, is necessary in order to permit the pooling of both confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence. We prefer to let the evidence on A be represented by a belief function that has structure identical to m,. In this way, both user and expert opinions are treated symmetrically through Dempster's rule. We choose mA2 as follows: One should note that mA2 contains evidence about the consequent B. This may give rise to the legitimate concern that the user must somehow have knowledge of the likelihood of B given A. While this is a natural consequence of mA2, we note that the user may declare his ignorance by choosing pa and qA small. In our view each user (and expert) has a single universal belief function over all the propositions in the system. We cannot expect this universal belief to be expressed but can rather expect expression of a partial belief function attached to a small number of closely related propositions. This partial belief is part of a (nonunique) decomposition of the larger universal belief function. All belief functions (including m,,) are already defined over the frame which implicitly includes the proposition B. The belief function mA2 merely makes this explicit.
with that contained in m,, it is necessary that So that the evidence contained in mA2 can be combined
This simply measures the weight of conflict between the two beliefs. The weight of conflict can be determined during the chaining process. Combination of the expert-supplied belief m3 with the user-supplied belief function mA2 given above yields BelAz3 = Bel,, @ Bel, :
B e /~, , ( ( * o ) )
= 0,
'"A,,I(O*)I
and Bel,, is zero for all other propositions except (**). It can be shown that Bel,,, has the desired property; i.e., BelAz3 { ( * 1 ) ) will increase or decrease from Bel, ( ( * 1 ) ) depending on the ratio p,/q, .
Refinement of frames and extension of beliefs
Refinement, extension, and compatibility Let Q , = V I , P2, ... 3 P"l be a collection of mutually supporting propositions, and let 0, be the frame of discernment related to Q , through the rule base M by the construction described in Section 2. Let 
. PJ).
Obviously, m is a marginal basic probability assignment of mE.
More generally, Shafer defines an extension when there is a compatibility relationship r between two frames 0, = {Si) and 0, = IT,) as follows:
m(S,).
Str7;and7;ce~
It should be noted that minimal extension and marginal are not exact dual operations. The extension of the margin of a belief function is not necessarily equal to the original belief function. Nevertheless, the margin of the extension of a belief function is always exactly equal to the original belief function.
Dependence and its implications for elicitation
The Dempster combination mechanism applies when two independent bodies of evidence over a frame are combined. It is important to notice that this is not necessarily an assumption of statistical independence if the combined beliefs are extended to a different but compatible frame of reference. It can be shown that there are an infinite number of probability assignments m , and m , , so that we can write m2 = m , @ m,, and m, over 0, is compatible with m, over 0,.
we wish to obtain a consensus opinion m, over 0, from a This provides a basis for eliciting expert opinions. Suppose pair of experts. We assume that one expert has an opinion over the frame 0, and the other has an opinion over a compatible frame 0, , which is more complicated because this expert has observed an event X . We assume that it is possible to compute certain elements for the frame 0, given the event x. for example, we suppose that it is possible to compute m,( ( IO)) in the example. We elicit an opinion m, from the first expert. Then we elicit the opinion m,, with respect to the frame 0, from the second expert who has observed the event X . We then compute m2 = m, @ m,, and compare the compatible elements from 0, with those "computable" elements of 0,. This provides a check on the internal consistency of the experts.
We should also point out that the particular form of belief m3 that we have chosen in Section 2 to represent the expertsupplied opinion allows a particularly simple method of elicitation. We merely ask the expert to supply r, the ratio of belief that the rule is correct to belief that the rule is incorrect. We also need to know u, the expert's total amount of uncertainty. Then the system can solve the two simultaneous equations to determine
Chaining of beliefs The basic mechanisms for propagating beliefs through a system are extension of the belief function to the refined frame and Dempster's rule of combination. In summary, as each rule is fired two events occur:
I . The current frame is refined, the visible elements are identified (remembering that the rule base has increased), and the current belief is extended to the visible elements. 2. Dempster's rule is used to combine the extension of the current belief with the extension of the expert-supplied belief attached to the rule.
Let R be a collection of propositions, and let 0 = 2" be the corresponding frame of discernment prior to the firing of a rule. We further assume that every rule exists as a conjunctive normal form. That is,
If a possible rule has a disjunctive antecedent, we merely split the rule into two or more rules with single (or possibly conjunctive) antecedents and the same consequent. If a possible rule has a conjunctive consequent, we merely split the rule into two or more rules with single (or possibly disjunctive) consequents and the same antecedent. We note that this assumption implies that the underlying graph is a Chow tree [8] . A Chow tree is a directed (and connected) graph with the property that there are no cycles in the corresponding undirected graph.
Suppose the rule R is fired. Let n* = n u P,, u . . ' u P,, u PC, and let 0* be the corresponding frame. The rule R determines a list of hidden elements according to the method described in Section 2 and hence a reduced frame of visible elements e**. Before the firing of the rule R, current beliefs are represented by the basic probability assignment m on 0. We construct the minimal extension of m to 0* and the margin of this extension on e**. In each case we denote the basic probability assignment m. This should engender no confusion since the same beliefs are represented by m in each case; the beliefs are referred to different frames. Finally, let mR stand for the basic probability assignment attached to the rule R. The effect of R can be written as
This notation is intended to describe the refinement and subsequent coarsening of the frame implied by the rule R and the simultaneous updating (by Dempster's rule) of m to the combination of m and mR.
Recall now the example introduced in Section 2. First, we note that the four rules do in fact form a Chow tree as depicted in Fig. I using standard AND/OR notation. To begin the actual propagation of evidence through the network in the example, suppose the user supplies evidence on A . Then R, fires and the beliefs represented by m, are extended to the smallest common refinement with the expert-supplied belief m, attached to the rule, namely the frame ( A , B) . Next, the frame is coarsened because of the one hidden element described by ( the hidden elements (IO***), (*110*), and (***lo); there are sixteen hidden elements and sixteen visible elements. The beliefs are combined to yield mAIC2,. We write 
Finally, the system computes the marginal belief on the coarsened frame (G). There are no hidden elements in this final coarsened frame, and in general applications there are no hidden elements in the final marginal frame on the goal nodes.
Suppose that an additional rule is appended to the previous system: R,: A + BC.
It should be noted that there are no hidden elements for the frame 0 = (A, B ) . If the network "fans out" in this manner, there can be no computational savings. On the other hand, if the system instead contains the additional rule R,: B + E, our methods will not work. If the system does not represent a Chow tree, then we have difficulty interpreting hidden and visible elements. We mention this to point out that if the network "fans in," then one must be particularly careful in applying our scheme.
There are two essential aspects of the system we have described here. First, we interpret Dempster's rule as a pooling mechanism. It is not an updating mechanism such as Bayes' rule. This world view of a belief function is essentially static. We assume the existence of an underlying universal frame of discernment with all epistemic possibilities contained in it. We are allowed to contemplate coarser versions of this frame and refinements of these coarsenings, but we are not allowed to augment the frame. Dempster's rule shifts belief over the different members of the power set of the frame.
rules define the frame. However, the rules identify certain elements which must be structural zeros in the expert's opinion. Of course, the expert may assign general values to all the other elements. The expert's total belief may be decomposed in an infinite number of possible sums. We have proposed one such decomposition which is tractable to compute and can be interpreted in correspondence with the expert's rules. 
